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Runtime Enforcement of K-step Opacity∗
Ylie`s Falcone Herve´ Marchand
Abstract— We study the enforcement of K-step opacity at
runtime. In K-step opacity, the knowledge of the secret is of
interest to the attacker within K steps after the secret occurs
and becomes obsolete afterwards. We introduce the mechanism
of runtime enforcer that is placed between the output of the
system and the attacker and enforces opacity using delays.
If an output event from the system violates K-step opacity,
the enforcer stores the event in the memory, for the minimal
number of system steps until the secret is no longer interesting
to the attacker (or, K-step opacity holds again).
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a major concern in nowadays information
systems. Among existing security notions, opacity (see e.g.,
[2], [3]) is a generic and general notion used to express
several existing confidentiality concerns such as trace-based
non-interference and anonymity (cf. [3]) and even secrecy
(cf. [4]). Opacity aims at preserving unwanted retrievals
of a system secret (e.g., values of confidential variables)
by untrustworthy users while observing the system. When
examining the opacity of a secret on a given system, we
check whether there are some executions of the system which
can lead an external attacker to know the secret; in that
case the secret is said to be leaking. While usual opacity
is concerned by the current disclosure of a secret, K-step
opacity, introduced in [5], additionally models secret retrieval
in the past (e.g., K execution steps before).
Ensuring opacity on a system is usually performed using
supervisory control (cf. [6], [7], [8], [9]). Supervisory control
consists in using a so-called controller to disable undesired
behaviors of the system, e.g., those leading to reveal the
secret. Moreover, the technique of dynamic observability was
proposed in [10] to ensure opacity by dynamically restrain-
ing, at each system step, the set of observable events. Finally,
[11] enforces opacity by statically inserting additional events
in the output behavior of the system.
These techniques suffer from practical limitations prevent-
ing their applicability in some situations. Static techniques
such as supervisory control are intrusive which entail to
disable some (internal) behaviors of the underlying system.
While ensuring opacity via dynamic observability comes at
the price of destroying observable behavior of the system.
Those limitations motivate for investigating the use of other
validation techniques to ensure opacity.
We are interested in runtime validation techniques, namely
runtime verification and runtime enforcement, so as to
validate several levels of opacity on a system. Runtime
verification (cf. [12], [13], [14]) consists in checking during
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the execution of a system whether a desired property holds
or not. Generally, one uses a special decision procedure, a
monitor, grabbing information in the run of an executing
system and acting as an oracle to decide property validation
or violation. Runtime enforcement (see [15], [16], [17]) is
an extension of runtime verification aiming to circumvent
property violations. Within this technique the monitor not
only observes program executions, but also modifies them,
using an internal memorization mechanism.
II. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
The problem can be depicted in Fig. 1a. A system G produces
sequences of events belonging to an alphabet Σ. Among the
possible executions of the system, some of these are said to
be secret. Some events of the system, in a sub-alphabet Σo ⊆
Σ, are observable by an external attacker through the system
interface. We assume that the attacker does not interfere with
the system (i.e., he performs only observations through the
interface) and has a perfect knowledge of the structure (even
internal) of the system. We are interested in the opacity of
the secret executions on the considered system. That is, from
a sequence of observable events, the attacker should not be
able to deduce whether (a prefix of) the current execution
of the system (corresponding to this observation) is secret or
not. In this case, the secret S is said to be opaque wrt. the
considered system and its interface.
We now sketch the techniques that we propose to analyze
and validate opacity. When model-checking (Fig. 1a) the
opacity of a secret on the system, we take its specification
to perform an analysis that provides the executions leading
to a security leakage when they are observed through the
interface of the system. This indicates existing flaws to the
system designer. When verifying opacity at runtime (Fig. 1b),
we introduce a runtime verifier which observes the same
sequence of observable events as the attacker and produces
verdicts related to the preservation or violation of the opacity.
With such a mechanism, the system administrator may react
and (manually) take appropriate measures. When enforcing
opacity at runtime (Fig. 1c), we introduce a runtime enforcer
between the system and the attacker. The sequence of observ-
able events is directly fed to the enforcer. The attacker now
observes the outputs produced by the runtime enforcer. The
runtime enforcer modifies its input sequence and produces a
new one in such a way that, on the output execution sequence
seen by the attacker, opacity is preserved wrt. the actual
execution on the initial system. Thus, the proposed runtime
enforcement automatically prevents opacity violation.
These runtime validation techniques have several advan-
tages. First, these techniques are not intrusive. Indeed, a
runtime verification or runtime enforcement framework does
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Fig. 1. Several ways to validate the opacity of a secret on a system
not suppose being able to modify the internal behavior of
the monitored system. It is particularly useful when dealing
with legacy code, leading model-checking to become obso-
lete since the internal system behavior cannot be modified.
Moreover, the proposed runtime-based approaches do not
distort the internal nor the observable behavior of the system.
Furthermore, checking the opacity at runtime allows to react
to misbehaviors; as shown with runtime enforcement in this
paper. Ensuring opacity with runtime enforcement also has
the advantage to modify the observable behavior of the
system in a minimal way: our runtime enforcers minimally
delay the initial execution sequence.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
A. Execution sequences
Unless otherwise specified, considered functions are total.
N denotes the set of non-negative integers. Considering a
finite set of elements E, a sequence s over E is a function
s : I → E where I is the integer interval [0, n] for some
n ∈ N. A language over E is a set of sequences over E.
We denote by E∗ the universal language over E (i.e., the set
of all finite sequences over E), by E+ the set of non-empty
finite sequences over E. Furthermore, for n ∈ N\{0, 1}, the
generalized Cartesian product of E is En
def
= E×E×· · ·×E,
i.e., the Cartesian product of E of dimension n. The empty
sequence of E∗ is denoted by ǫE or ǫ when clear from the
context. The length of a finite sequence s ∈ E∗ is noted |s|.
For a sequence s ∈ E+ and i < |s|, the (i+1)-th element of
s is denoted by si, and the subsequence containing the i+1
first elements of s is denoted s···i. For s, s′ ∈ E∗, we denote
by s ·s′ the concatenation of s and s′, and by s  s′ the fact
that s is a prefix of s′ (i.e., when ∀i ∈ [0, |s| − 1] : si = s′i
and |s| ≤ |s′|). The prefix-closure of a language L wrt. E∗
is defined as Pref(L)
def
= {s ∈ E∗ | ∃s′ ∈ E∗ : s · s′ ∈ L}.
Given s′  s, |s− s′|
def
= |s| − |s′|.
Behaviors of systems are modeled by Labelled Transitions
Systems (LTS for short) whose actions belong to a finite set
Σ. Sequences of actions are named execution sequences. The
formal definition of an LTS is as follows:
Definition 1 (LTS): A deterministic LTS is a 4-tuple G =
(QG , qG
init
,Σ, δG) where Q
G is a finite set of states, qG
init
∈
QG is the initial state, Σ is the alphabet of actions, and
δG : Q
G × Σ→ QG is the partial transition function.
We consider an LTS G = (QG , qG
init
,Σ, δG). We write q
a
→G
q′ for δG(q, a) = q
′ and q
a
→G for ∃q
′ ∈ QG : q
a
→G q
′.
We extend →G to arbitrary execution sequences by setting:
q
ǫ
→G q for every state q, and q
sσ
→G q
′ whenever q
s
→G q
′′
and q′′
σ
→G q
′, for some q′′ ∈ QG . For any language L ⊆ Σ∗
and set of states X ⊆ QG , we set ∆G(X,L)
def
= {q ∈ QG |
∃s ∈ L, ∃q′ ∈ X : q′
s
→G q}. L(G)
def
= {s ∈ Σ∗ | qG
init
s
→G}
denotes the set of execution sequences of G. Given a set
of marked states FG ⊆ Q
G , the marked language of G is
LFG (G)
def
= {s ∈ Σ∗ | ∃q ∈ FG : q
G
init
s
→G q}, i.e., the
execution sequences that end in FG . Notations apply to finite-
state machines which are LTSs with an output function.
B. Observational behavior
The observation interface between a user and the system
is specified by a sub-alphabet of events Σo ⊆ Σ. The
user observation through an interface is then defined by a
projection, denoted by PΣo , from Σ
∗ to Σ∗o that erases in
an execution sequence of Σ∗ all events not in Σo. Formally,
PΣo(ǫΣ)
def
= ǫΣ and PΣo(s · σ)
def
= PΣo(s) · σ if σ ∈ Σo and
PΣo(s) otherwise. This definition extends to any language
L ⊆ Σ∗: PΣo(L)
def
= {µ ∈ Σ∗o | ∃s ∈ L : µ = PΣo(s)}. In
particular, given an LTS G over Σ and a set of observable
actions Σo ⊆ Σ, the set of observed traces of G is TΣo(G)
def
=
PΣo(L(G)). Given two execution sequences s, s
′ ∈ Σ∗,
they are equivalent w.r.t. PΣo , noted s ≈Σo s
′ whenever
PΣo(s) = PΣo(s
′). Given two execution sequences s, s′ such
that s′  s, s\s′ is the suffix of s that permits to extend s′ to
s, and |s− s′|Σo
def
= |PΣo(s)| − |PΣo(s
′)| corresponds to the
number of observable events that are necessary to extend s′
into s. Conversely, given L ⊆ Σ∗o, the inverse projection of
L is P−1Σo (L)
def
= {s ∈ Σ∗ | PΣo(s) ∈ L}. Given µ ∈ TΣo(G),
[[µ]]GΣo
def
= P−1Σo (µ) ∩ L(G) (noted [[µ]]Σo when clear from
context) is the set of observation traces of G compatible
with µ, i.e., execution sequences of G having trace µ. Given
µ′  µ, we note [[µ′/µ]]Σo
def
= [[µ′]]Σo ∩ Pref([[µ]]Σo) the set
of traces of G that are still compatible with µ′ knowing that
µ′ is the prefix of µ that occurred in the system.
C. K-delay state estimators
To generate runtime verifiers and enforcers, we will need
the notion of K-delay state estimator introduced in [5].
Intuitively, a K-delay state estimator, according to the ob-
servation interface of a system, indicates the estimated states
of the system during the K previous steps.
We consider the set of l-tuples of states, for l ≥ 2, of
G. Elements of Ql model partial sequences of states. A set
m ∈ 2Q
l
is called an l-dimensional state mapping. We denote
by m(i) the set of the (l − i)th state of elements of m.
Intuitively, m(0) corresponds to the current state estimate
whereas m(i) corresponds to the state estimate knowing that
i observations have been made. We also need to define:
• the shift operator ◭: 2Q
l
× 2Q
2
→ 2Q
l
s.t.
m ◭ m2
def
= {(q2, . . . , ql+1) ∈ Q
l |
(q1, . . . , ql) ∈ m ∧ (ql, ql+1) ∈ m2},
• the observation mapping Obs : Σo → 2
Q2 s.t.
Obs(σ)
def
= {(q1, q2) | ∃s ∈ Σ
+ : PΣo(s) = σ ∧ q1
s
→G q2},
• the function ⊙l : 2
E → 2E
l
s.t. ⊙l(E)
def
= {(e, . . . , e) |
e ∈ E}, for a set E.
Based on the previous operations, K-delay state estimators
are defined as follows:
Definition 2 (K-Delay State Estimator): For G, a secret
S, a projection PΣo , the K-delay state estimator is an LTS
D = (MD,mD
init
,Σo, δD) s.t.:
• MD is the smallest subset of 2Q
K+1
reachable from mD
init
with δD,
• mD
init
def
=
{
tq ∈ ⊙K+1({q}) | q ∈ ∆G({q
G
init
}, [[ǫ]]Σo)
}
,
• δD : M
D × Σo →M
D defined by ∀m ∈MD, ∀σ ∈ Σo :
δD(m,σ)
def
= m ◭ Obs(σ).
A K-delay state estimator, for G, is an LTS whose states
contain suffixes of length K of “observable runs” that are
compatible with the current observation on G. On each
transition fired by σ ∈ Σo, possibly visited states more than
K steps ago are forgotten, and the current state estimate
is updated: for a transition, the arriving state is obtained
using the shift operator (◭) and putting in front (at the
location of the current state estimate) compatible current
states according to the state estimate at the previous step
(i.e., Obs(σ) “filtered” by ◭).
D. K-step (state-based) Opacity
Opacity is defined on the observable and unobservable be-
haviors of the system. We consider that confidential informa-
tion is directly encoded by means of a set of states S ⊆ QG .
If the current execution is t ∈ L(G), the attacker should not
be able to deduce, from the knowledge of PΣo(t) and the
structure of G, that the current state of the system is in S.
Confidentiality requirements may also prohibit inferring
that the system went through a secret state in the past. To take
into account this particularity,K-step opacity was introduced
in [5]1. Intuitively, K-step opacity takes into account the
opacity of the secret in the past and also allows to say
that the knowledge of the secret becomes worthless after
the observation of a given number of actions.
Definition 3 (K-step opacity): For K ∈ N, the secret
S is K-step opaque on G under the projection PΣo or
(G, PΣo ,K) opaque if
∀t ∈ L(G), ∀t′  t : |t− t′|Σo ≤ K ∧ t
′ ∈ LS(G)
⇒ ∃s ∈ L(G), ∃s′  s : s ≈Σo t ∧ s
′ ≈Σo t
′ ∧ s′ /∈ LS(G).
The secret S is K-step opaque on G if for every execution
t of G, for every secret execution t′ prefix of t with an ob-
servable difference inferior to K, there exist two executions
s and s′ observationally equivalent respectively to t and t′
s.t. s′ is not a secret execution.
Remark 1: If S is (G, PΣo ,K) opaque then S is
(G, PΣo ,K
′) opaque for K ′ ≤ K. Moreover, 0-step opacity
corresponds to “current” opacity (as defined in [2]).
Example 1: Consider Σo = {a, b}.
1Compared with [5], for simplicity, we only consider a unique initial state
and deterministic LTSs.
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Fig. 2. Several systems with secret states (red squares)
• On G1 (Fig. 2a), the secret is not (G1, PΣo , 0)-opaque,
as after the observation of a trace in b∗ ·a·b, the attacker
knows that the system is currently in a secret state (but
does not know whether it is q2 or q5).
• On G2 (Fig. 2b), the secret is (G2, PΣo , 1) opaque.
However, the secret is not (G2, PΣo , 2) opaque as only
τ ·a ·b ·a is a compatible execution with the observation
a · b · a. After the last a has occured, the attacker can
deduce that the system was in state q2 two steps ago.
IV. VERIFICATION OF OPACITY AT RUNTIME
A. Characterizing opacity on the observable behavior
To validate opacity with runtime techniques, we need to
characterize K-step opacity in terms of observable behavior.
Proposition 1: S ⊆ QG is (G, PΣo ,K) opaque iff
∀µ ∈ TΣo(G), ∀µ
′  µ : |µ−µ′| ≤ K ⇒ [[µ′/µ]]Σo 6⊆ LS(G).
S is (G, PΣo ,K) opaque if for each observable system trace
µ, and each of its prefixes µ′ with less than K observations
less than µ, if there exists an execution compatible with µ′
ending in a secret state, then there exists another compatible
execution that does not end in a secret state.
In the sequel, the set of traces, for which the K-step
opacity of the secret is revealed, is formally defined by:
leak(G, PΣo , S)
def
=
{
µ ∈ TΣo(G) |
∃µ′  µ :|µ− µ′| ≤ K ∧ [[µ′/µ]]Σo ⊆ LS(G)
}
.
(1)
Corollary 1: S is (G, PΣo ,K) opaque iff
leak(G, PΣo , S) = ∅.
In some cases, it is interesting to characterize the set of traces
that reveal the secret at exactly k steps with k ≤ K:
leak(G, PΣo , S, k)
def
= {µ ∈ TΣo(G) | (3) ∧ (4)}, (2)
with
∃µ′  µ : |µ− µ′| = k ∧ [[µ′/µ]]Σo ⊆ LS(G), (3)
∀µ′  µ : |µ− µ′| < k ⇒ [[µ′/µ]]Σo 6⊆ LS(G). (4)
That is, there exists an observation trace that reveals the
opacity of the secret k steps ago (3) and every observation
trace which is produced strictly less than k steps ago does
not reveal the opacity (4). Furthermore, one may notice that⋃
0≤k≤K leak(G, PΣo , S, k) = leak(G, PΣo , S).
B. Synthesizing Runtime Verifiers
We present how we runtime verify the opacity of a secret
on a given system using a monitor. A monitor captures, for
each observation µ ∈ Σ∗o, what the attacker can infer about
the current execution of the system and the possible leakage
of the secret w.r.t. the considered opacity. A monitor can be
used by an administrator to discover opacity leakages on the
system and take appropriate reactions.
Definition 4 (Runtime verifier): A runtime verifier (R-
Verifier) V is a finite-state machine (QV , qV
init
,Σo, δV , D,Γ
V)
where ΓV : QV → D is the output function. D
def
=
{leak0, . . . , leakK, noleak} is the truth domain.
We now state the properties that an R-Verifier should satisfy:
Definition 5 (R-Verifier soundness and completeness):
An R-Verifier V is sound and complete w.r.t. G, PΣo , S
whenever ∀µ ∈ TΣo(G), ∀l ∈ [0,K] :
ΓV(δV(q
V
init
, µ)) = leakl ⇔ µ ∈ leak(G, PΣo , S, l)
∧ ΓV(δV(q
V
init
, µ)) = noleak ⇔ µ /∈ leak(G, PΣo , S).
An R-Verifier is sound (⇒ direction) if it never gives a false
verdict. It is complete (⇐ direction) if all observations raise
an appropriate “leak” verdict: a noleak verdict when the
opacity is preserved, a leakl verdict when the opacity leaks at
l observable steps on the system. R-Verifiers are synthesized
directly from K-delay state estimators.
Proposition 2: For G, S ⊆ QG , the R-Verifier V = (QV ,
qV
init
, Σo, δV ,D,Γ
V) built from the K-delay state estimator
D = (MD,mD
init
,Σo, δD) of G where Q
V = MD, qV
init
=
mD
init
, δV = δD, and Γ
V : QV → D defined by
• ΓV(m) = noleak if ∀k ∈ [0,K] : m(k) /∈ 2S ,
• ΓV(m) = leakl where l = min{k ∈ [0,K] | m(k) ∈
2S} otherwise,
is sound and complete w.r.t. G, PΣo , S and K-step opacity.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF OPACITY AT RUNTIME
We build runtime enforcers for K-step opacity. An underly-
ing hypothesis is that the system is live, i.e., not deadlocked
and always produces events, e.g., a reactive system. Roughly
speaking, the purpose of a runtime enforcer is to read some
(unsafe) execution sequence produced by G (input to the
enforcer) and to transform it into an output sequence that
is safe regarding opacity (see Fig. 1c).
A runtime enforcer acts as a delayer on an input sequence
µ, using its internal memory to memorize some of the events
produced by G. It releases a prefix o of µ containing some
stored events, when the system has produced enough events
so that the opacity is ensured, i.e., when the enforcer releases
an output o (the only sequence seen by the attacker), then
either this sequence does not reveal the opacity of the secret
or the system has already produced a sequence µ  o,
making the knowledge of o obsolete to the attacker. For
instance, if the enforcer releases a sequence o leaking the
secret at k ≤ K steps, it has already received a sequence µ
from the system s.t. |µ| − |o| > K − k.
Let us illustrate informally how we enforce opacity.
Example 2 (Principle of enforcing opacity): On G2, the
secret is not (G2, PΣo , 2) opaque because of the observation
sequence a ·b ·a. A runtime enforcer will delay this sequence
in such a way that, when the attacker determines that the
system was in a secret secret, it is always more than K = 2
steps ago on the real system. That is, some of the events
produced by the system will be retained inside the enforcer
memory. Intuitively, for the aforementioned sequence, the
expected behavior of a runtime enforcer is as follows.
Sequence of G2 Obs. sequence Memory Output
τ ǫ ǫ ǫ
τ · a a ǫ a
τ · a · b a · b ǫ a · b
τ · a · b · a a · b · a a a · b
τ · a · b · a · a a · b · a · a ǫ a · b · a · a
τ · a · b · a
+
a · b · a
+
ǫ a · b · a
+
When the system produces the sequence τ · a, the enforcer
should not modify the observation trace a which is safe
regarding opacity. When the system produces the sequence
τ ·a ·b, the enforcer observes a ·b and lets the system execute
normally (we expect the system execution to be minimally
modified). Then, when the system produces a new a, the
enforcer memorizes this event (the attacker still sees a · b).
Next, when the system produces another a, the system was in
a secret state 3 steps ago. Thus, the enforcer can release the
first stored a. Indeed, when the attacker observes a · b ·a, the
system has produced a ·b ·a ·a, and was in the secret state q2
three steps ago: (G2, PΣo , 2) opacity of S is thus preserved.
Finally, the last received a and subsequent ones can be freely
output by the enforcer since they preserve 2-step opacity.
A. Defining Runtime Enforcers
We define a generic notion of runtime enforcers which are
special finite-state machines. By reading events, they produce
enforcement operations that delay the input trace or release
some already stored events to ensure opacity.
Definition 6 (Enforcement operations Ops and memory):
The memory of runtime enforcers is a list whose elements
are pairs consisting of an observable event and an integer.
The set of possible configurations of the memory is thus
M(T ) =
⋃T
i=0(Σo×N)
i. When an element (σ, d) ∈ Σo×N
is inside the memory, it means that the event σ has to
be retained d units of time before being released by the
enforcer to preserve opacity. Enforcement operations take
as inputs an observable event and a memory content (i.e.,
a special sequence of events, detailed later) to produce in
output an observable sequence and a new memory content:
Ops ⊆ 2(Σo×M(T ))→(Σ
∗
o×M(T )).
Examples of enforcement operations consist of memorizing
input events or halting the underlying system. In Section V-
C, we define enforcement operations dedicated to opacity.
Definition 7 (Generic R-Enforcer (R-Enforcer(Ops))):
An R-Enforcer E is a 6-tuple (QE , qE
init
,Σo, δE ,Ops,
ΓE ,M(T )) defined relatively to a set of observable events
Σo and parameterized by a set of enforcement operations
Ops. The finite set QE denotes the control states, qE
init
∈ QE
is the initial state. δE : Q
E × Σo → Q
E is the transition
function. The function ΓE : QE → Ops associates an
enforcement operation to each state.
Informally an R-Enforcer performs a transition by reading
an event produced by the system. The arriving state of the
transition is associated to an enforcement operation which
is applied to the current event and the memory content. In
the following we abbreviate δE(q, a) = q
′ by q
a
−→E q
′. The
notion of run is naturally transposed from its definition for
LTSs: for a trace µ = σ0 · · ·σn−1 of length n run(µ, E) =
(q0, σ0/α0, q1) · (q1, σ1/α1, q2) · · · (qn−1, σn−1/ αn−1, qn),
with ∀i ∈ [0, n − 1] : ΓE(qi+1) = αi. In the remainder,
E = (QE , qE
init
,Σo, δE ,Ops, Γ
E , M(T )) designates an R-
Enforcer and µ ∈ Σ∗o designates the current observation trace
of the system input to the R-Enforcer. We formalize how
R-Enforcers(Ops) react to input traces through the standard
notions of configuration and derivation.
Definition 8 (Semantics of R-Enforcer(Ops)): A configu-
ration is a 3-tuple (q, µ, c) ∈ QE × Σ∗o ×M(T ) where q
denotes the current control state, µ the remaining trace to
read, and c the current memory configuration.
• A configuration (q′, µ′, c′) is derivable in one step from the
configuration (q, µ, c) and produces the output2 o ∈ Σ∗o,
and we note (q, µ, c)
o
→֒ (q′, µ′, c′) if and only if µ =
σ · µ′ ∧ q
σ
−→E q
′ ∧ ΓE(q′) = α ∧ α(σ, c) = (o, c′).
• A configuration C ′ is derivable in several steps from a
configuration C and produces the output o ∈ Σ∗o, and we
note C
o
=⇒E C
′, if and only if
∃k ≥ 0, ∃C0, . . . , Ck : C = C0 ∧ C
′ = Ck
∧∀i ∈ [0, k[, ∃oi ∈ Σ
∗
o : Ci
oi
→֒ Ci+1
∧o = o0 · · · ok−1.
We define the transformation performed by an R-Enforcer,
with a set of enforcement operations Ops.
Definition 9 (Trace transformation): E transforms µ into
the output trace o  µ as defined by the relation ⇓E⊆ Σ
∗
o ×
Σ∗o, where ǫ refers to ǫΣo :
• ǫ ⇓E ǫ,
• µ ⇓E o if ∃q ∈ Q
E , ∃c ∈ M(T ) : (qE
init
, µ, ǫM)
o
=⇒E
(q, ǫ, c).
The empty sequence ǫ is not modified by E (i.e., when the
system does not produce any event). The observation trace
µ ∈ Σ∗o is transformed by E into the trace o ∈ Σ
∗
o, when
the trace is transformed from the initial state of E , starting
with an empty memory. Note that the resulting memory
configuration c depends on the sequence µ\o of events read
by the R-Enforcer but not produced in output yet as we shall
see in the remainder of this section.
B. Enforcing the opacity at runtime
Before defining this enforcement notion more formally, we
first formalize, for a given trace of G, which of its prefixes
can be safely output.
Definition 10 (Prefixes that are safe to output): For K-
step opacity, a trace µ ∈ TΣo(G), we say that it is safe to
output µ′  µ, noted safe(µ, µ′), if
µ′ /∈ leak(G, PΣo , S)
∨∃k ≤ K : (µ′ ∈ leak(G, PΣo , S, k) ∧ |µ| − |µ
′| ≥ K − k).
That is, it is safe to produce µ′  µ if either µ′ does not
reveal the opacity or it reveals the opacity at k steps but it
was produced on the system more than k steps ago. Note that
when it is safe to produce a given trace, then all its prefixes
are safe to produce:
∀µ, µ′ ∈ TΣo(G) : safe(µ, µ
′)⇒ ∀µ′′ ≺ µ′ : safe(µ, µ′′).
2Note that o can be ǫ if the enforcer chooses to not produce an output.
Furthermore, by convention, we will only consider systems
for which it is safe to produce ǫ, i.e., when some sequences
of [[ǫ]]Σo are not secret. Under the assumption that the system
is alive, for a given trace, there always exists one of its
extension traces which is safe to output, i.e.,
∀µ ∈ TΣo(G), ∃µ
′ ∈ TΣo(G) : µ  µ
′ ∧ safe(µ′, µ).
e.g., any µ′ s.t. |µ′−µ| > K. Moreover, the set of traces that
lead a given sequence to be safe is extension-closed, i.e.,
∀µ′ ∈ TΣo(G) :(∃µ ∈ TΣo(G) : µ
′  µ ∧ safe(µ, µ′))
⇒ (∀µ′′ ∈ TΣo(G) : µ  µ
′′ ⇒ safe(µ′′, µ′)).
1) Expected properties for runtime enforcers.: We now
explain what we mean exactly by opacity enforcement, and
what are the consequences of this definition on the systems
and secrets. The following constraints are expected to hold
for the enforcers we aim to synthesize.
• soundness: the output trace should preserve the opacity
of the system;
• transparency: the input trace should be modified in a
minimal way, namely if it already preserves opacity it
should remain unchanged, otherwise its longest prefix
preserving opacity should be issued.
On Example 2, soundness entails a runtime enforcer to e.g.,
output a · b (instead of a · b · a) when G2 produces τ · a · b · a.
Transparency entails a runtime enforcer to e.g., output a · b ·
a · a (instead of any prefix) when G2 produces τ · a · b · a · a.
Remark 2: There always exists a trivial, sound but gen-
erally non transparent, enforcer delaying every event by K
units of time for K-step opacity.
The formal definition of opacity-enforcement by a runtime
enforcer relates the input sequence produced by the program
fed to the enforcer and the allowed output sequence so that
the enforcer is sound and transparent.
Definition 11 (Enforcement of opacity by an enforcer):
The R-Enforcer E enforces the K-step opacity of S w.r.t.
PΣo on a system G if ∀µ ∈ TΣo(G), ∃o  µ : µ ⇓E o⇒
µ /∈ leak(G, PΣo , S)⇒ o = µ (5)
µ ∈ leak(G, PΣo , S)⇒ o = max

{µ′  µ | safe(µ, µ′)}. (6)
A sound and transparent R-Enforcer always produces maxi-
mal safe sequences:
Proposition 3: For a sound and transparent R-EnforcerE:
∀µ ∈ TΣo(G), ∀o  µ :
µ ⇓E o⇒
(
safe(µ, o) ∧ ∀o ≺ o′  µ : ¬ safe(µ, o′)
)
.
Most of the previous enforcement approaches (e.g., [18],
[14]) used enforcement mechanisms with a finite but un-
bounded memory under the soundness and transparency
constraints. Since we are setting our approach in a general
security context, we go one step further on the practical
constraints expected for a desired enforcement mechanism
dedicated to opacity. Here we consider that the memory
allocated to the enforcer has a given size3:
• do-not-overflow: the size of the partial trace memorized
by the enforcer does not exceed the allocated memory size.
3Besides memory size limitation, this constraint can represent the desired
quality of service, e.g., maximal allowed delay.
2) When is the opacity of a secret enforceable on a sys-
tem?: After stating the constraints on runtime enforcement
for opacity, we need to delineate the systems, interfaces and
secrets s.t. opacity is enforceable using runtime enforcers.
Existence of sound and transparent R-Enforcers with un-
bounded memory for opacity relies first on the provided
characterization of opacity preservation on the observable
behavior as finitary properties (Section III-D) and second
on existing results in enforcement monitoring of finitary
properties (see e.g., [18], [14]). Now, the existence of an
R-Enforcer for K-step opacity relies only on the do-not-
overflow constraint of a memory of size T , defined as
max
µ∈TΣo (G)
{
min{|µ \ o| | o  µ ∧ safe(µ, o)}
}
≤ T.
The previous enforcement criterion is not usable in practice
and is not computable generally. Thus, we will give a more
practical and decidable enforcement criterion using K-delay
state estimators. To each state of the K-delay state estimator,
we have seen that it is possible to determine the opacity
leakage. Intuitively, the reasoning is as follows. If we reach
a state in the K-delay state estimator s.t. it leaks the 2-step
opacity of the secret (i.e., the attacker knows that the system
was in a secret state 2 steps ago). Then for K ≥ 2, the
enforcer has to delay the last event produced by the system
by K − 1 units of time. Indeed, after that, the attacker will
know that the system was in a secret state K + 1 steps ago.
This knowledge is safe w.r.t. K-step opacity.
The criterion on K-delay state estimators uses the follow-
ing lemma, which is a direct consequence of the accuracy of
state estimators.
Lemma 1: Given a system G, a projection map PΣo , and
a secret S, the states of the K-delay state estimator D =
(QD, qD
init
,Σo, δD) are s.t.:
∀µ1, µ2 ∈ TΣo(G) : δD(m
D
init
, µ1) = δD(m
D
init
, µ2)⇒
∃k ∈ [0,K] : µ1, µ2 ∈ leak(G, PΣo , S, k)
∨ µ1, µ2 /∈ leak(G, PΣo , S).
All traces ending in a given state of the state estimator reveal
or preserve opacity in the same way. Thus, in aK-delay state
estimator D = (QD,mD
init
,Σo, δD), to each state m ∈ Q
D,
we can associate the delay to hold (i.e., after which it is safe
to “release”) the last received event of the trace leading to
this state in order to preserve opacity: ∀m ∈ QD :
hold(m)
def
=
{
K + 1− k when (7)
0 otherwise (i.e., when (8))
with:
∃k ∈ [0,K], ∀µ ∈ TΣo(G) :
δD(m
D
init
, µ) = m⇒ µ ∈ leak(G, PΣo , S, k)
(7)
∀µ ∈ TΣo(G) :
δD(m
D
init
,µ) = m⇒ µ /∈ leak(G, PΣo , S)
(8)
Equivalently, using an R-Verifier V = (QV , qV
init
,Σo,
δV ,D,Γ
V) for G and K-step opacity, and synthesized from
D (thus QD = QV and qD
init
= qV
init
), ∀µ ∈ TΣo(G) :
hold(δD(m
D
init
, µ)) = K + 1 − k when ΓV(δV(q
V
init
, µ)) =
leakk. Thus, synthesis of R-Enforcers will rely on the
synthesis of R-Verifiers.
Proposition 4: Let D = (QD,mD
init
,Σo, δD) be the K-
delay state estimator associated to G. The K-step opacity of
the secret S is enforceable by an R-Enforcer with a memory
of size T iff max{hold(m) | m ∈ QD} ≤ T .
Consequently, enforcement of a K-step opacity with a mem-
ory of a given size is decidable.
C. Synthesis of runtime enforcers
To address the synthesis of runtime enforcers for opacity, we
first define their primitives: the enforcement operations.
1) Enforcement operations: Let us define some auxiliary
operations. In the following, we will use the following nota-
tions for the memory of R-Enforcers. For a pair (σ, d) ∈ Σo×
N, (σ, d).delay
def
= d. For two memory configurations c, c′ s.t.
c = ((σ1, d1) · · · (σt, dt)), c
′ = ((σ1, d1) · · · (σt′ , dt′)) with
t′ ≤ t,:
• c↓Σo
def
= σ1 · · ·σt,
• (c \ c′)↓Σo is ǫΣo if c = c
′ and the sequence of events
σt′+1 · · ·σt otherwise.
Definition 12 (Auxiliary operations): For a memoryM of
size T , given t ≤ T and c = (σ1, d1) · · · (σt, dt) ∈ M(T ),
free and delay (M(T )→M(T )) are defined as follows:
• delay(c)
def
= (σ1, d1 − 1) · · · (σt, dt − 1), with t ≤ T ;
• free(c)
def
= (σi, di) · · · (σt, dt), with 1 ≤ i ≤ t and
∀j ∈ [1, i− 1] : cj .delay ≤ 0 ∧ ∀j ∈ [i, t] : cj .delay > 0.
The operation delay consists in decrementing the delay of
each element inside the memory. Intuitively, this operation
is used when one step has been performed on the system,
and thus the stored events revealing the opacity have to be
retained for one unit of time less. The operation free consists
in outputting the events that currently do not leak opacity
(with a negative or null delay). The following operations are
those actually used by the runtime enforcers.
Definition 13: The enforcement operations are defined as
follows where σ ∈ Σo, c = (σ1, d1) · · · (σt, dt) ∈M(T ).
• stored(σ, c)
def
= (o, c′ · (σ, d)), with c′ = free ◦ delay(c),
o = (c \ c′)↓Σo ;
• dump(σ, c)
def
= (o, c′′) with
• c′
def
= free ◦ delay(c),
• o
def
= c↓Σo · σ if c
′ = ǫM and (c \ c
′)↓Σo else,
• c′′
def
= (c \ c′) · (σ, 0) if c′ 6= ǫM and ǫM else;
• off(σ, c)
def
= dump(σ, c);
• halt(σ, c)
def
= (ǫΣo , ǫM).
For d ∈ [1,K], the stored operation is issued when the
event submitted to the R-Enforcer should be delayed by d
unit(s) of time in order to preserve opacity. This operation
consists in first releasing the events preserving the opacity
(using free ◦ delay) and appending the event with the needed
delay to the memory. The dump operation is issued when
the submitted event does not reveal the opacity. The event
is submitted but not necessarily produced in output. The R-
Enforcer first releases the events preserving the opacity. After
this step, if the memory is empty, then the event is appended
to the output sequence. Otherwise, the event is appended
in the memory with delay 0 so as to first be released in
the future and preserve the order of the input trace. The
off operation is issued by an R-Enforcer when the opacity
will not be revealed whatever are the future observable
events produced by the system. Thus, the R-Enforcer can
be switched off. Although the off has the same definition as
the dump operation, such an enforcement operation is useful
in practice since it reduces the overhead induced by the R-
Enforcer. The halt operation is issued when the considered
notion of opacity is irremediably revealed. This operation
consists in ignoring the submitted event, erasing the memory,
and stopping the underlying system.
2) Synthesis of R-Enforcers: We propose now to address
the synthesis of R-Enforcers relying on K-delay state esti-
mators and the function hold.
Proposition 5: Given G, S and Σo ⊆ Σ, the R-Enforcer
E = (QE , qE
init
,Σo, δE , {halt, stored, dump, off | d ∈
[1,K]},ΓE , M(T )), built from the K-delay state estimator
D = (MD,mD
init
,Σo, δD) of G where Q
E = MD, qE
init
=
mD
init
, δE = δD, and Γ
E : QE → {off, dump, stored, halt |
d ∈ [1, T ]} defined by:
• ΓE(m) = off if hold(m) = 0 ∧ ∀m′ ∈ ∆D({m},Σ
∗
o) :
hold(m′) = 0,
• ΓE(m) = dump if hold(m) = 0 ∧ ∃m′ ∈ ∆D({m},Σ
∗
o) :
hold(m′) 6= 0,
• ΓE(m) = stored if ∃d ∈ [1, T ] : hold(m) = d,
• ΓE(m) = halt if ∃d > T : hold(m) = d.
enforces the K-step opacity of S under PΣo on G.
An R-Enforcer built following this construction processes
an observation trace of the underlying system and enforces
the opacity of the secret. As for the R-Verifier, the R-Enforcer
has the same structure as the K-delay state estimator. To build
the R-Enforcer, for each state m of the K-delay state estima-
tor, one needs to determine hold(m) which can be obtained
using the opacity leakage provided by the R-Verifier (see
Section V-B). An R-Enforcer switches off when the current
read observation trace and all its possible continuations on
the system do not leak the opacity of the secret. It dumps
the event of the last observed trace when this trace does not
leak the opacity but there is a possibility that the secret may
leak in the future. It stores the last event of the observed
trace in memory for d unit(s) of time, with d ≤ T , when
the current sequence leads the K-step opacity to be revealed
K+1−d step(s) ago (hold(m) = d). Consequently, when the
attacker will observe this event, this will reveal the opacity
of the secret at strictly more than K steps. When the current
sequence leaks the K opacity of the secret d steps ago with
d > T , the R-Enforcer halts the underlying system since the
last event of this sequence cannot be memorized with the
allocated memory of size T .
Example 3: Fig. 3 represents the R-Enforcers of G1 and
G2 for 1-step and 2-step opacity, respectively. We assume a
sufficient memory, i.e., T ≥ 2 for G1 and T ≥ 1 for G2.
Remark 3 (R-Enforcer optimization): In R-Enforcers, we
can reduce the states in which the off operation is produced,
into a unique state. This is a straightforward adaptation of
the transformation that is not modifying their correctness.
m0
dump
m1
dump
m2
dump
m3
store–2
m4
store–1
m5
store–1
m6
off
m7
off
m8
off
m9
off
m10
off
m11
off
a
b
b
a
b
a
b
a, b
a, b
a, b
a, b
bba
a, b
a
ba
(a) 1-step of G1
m0
dump
m1
dump
m2
dump
m3
store–1
m4
off
m5
off
m6
off
a
b
a
b
b
b
a
a
(b) 2-step of G2
Fig. 3. R-Enforcer for K-step opacity
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Model-checking of K-step opacity
In [19] and its companion paper [20], the authors ad-
dressed the model-checking of K-step opacity, using K-
delay state estimators. A secret S is (G, PΣo ,K) opaque iff
there does not exist a state m reachable in D, the K-delay
state estimator of G, such that ∃k ∈ [0,K] : m(k) ∈ 2S .
B. Using runtime techniques
1) Validating simple opacity via testing: In [21], the
authors are interested in testing the simple opacity of a
system. In the context of ensuring opacity via access control
mechanisms, the authors extend the classical theory of con-
formance testing in order to derive tests that detect violation
of conformance by an access control implementation to
its specification. Testing is another runtime-based validation
technique to validate opacity. The authors only address the
current opacity of the secret. Validation of the K-step based
opacity through testing remains to be studied.
2) Runtime verification and enforcement for linear-time
properties: Numerous runtime verification and enforcement
frameworks exist for linear-time properties (cf. [17] for a
short survey). Most of them focus on monitoring safety
properties. Runtime enforcement was initiated by the work
of [15] on what has been called security automata; i.e.,
monitors watching the execution and halting the program
whenever it deviates from the desired property. Later, [22]
proposed a more powerful enforcement mechanism called
edit-automata. This mechanism featured the idea of “sup-
pressing” (i.e., freezing) and “inserting” (frozen) actions in
the current execution of a system.
To the best of our knowledge, only one runtime validation
approach was proposed for (current) opacity [23]. Thus, this
article first addresses runtime verification for K-step opacity
and introduces runtime enforcement as a validation technique
for opacity. Note that the notion of runtime enforcer proposed
in this paper is inspired from and extends the variant used
in [24] to enforce linear-time properties.
C. Comparison with supervisory control
Because of the halt operation, runtime enforcement is
similar to supervisory control. Indeed, blocking the system
or letting its execution going through are the only primitives
endowed to controllers. The difference between supervisory
control and runtime enforcement is as follows. In supervisory
control, the underlying system is put in parallel with a
controller. When a controlled system tries to perform an
illegal action, this action is disabled by the controller. In
runtime enforcement, actions of the systems are directly fed
to the enforcer, that delays or suppresses illegal actions.
Illegal actions are thus actually executed on the system but
not produced in output. (the effect of illegal actions is not
visible from the outside). Hence, enforcement monitoring
is appropriate to ensure a desired behavior on the system
outputs, while supervisory control is appropriate to ensure
a desired behavior on the internal behavior of a system.
Finally, note that, the system to be considered in a runtime
enforcement approach is the initial system along with its
runtime enforcer, while in supervisory control, it is the
product between the initial system and the controller.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
1) Conclusion: We are interested in the use of runtime
techniques to ensure K-step opacity. Proposed runtime tech-
niques are complementary to supervisory control, which is
usually used to validate opacity on systems. With runtime
verification, we are able to detect leakages for the various
levels of opacity. With runtime enforcement, opacity leakages
are prevented, and this technique guarantees opacity preser-
vation for the system of interest. The techniques proposed
in this paper have several advantages compared to existing
validation approaches for opacity. With the aim of ensur-
ing the opacity of system, runtime enforcement is a non
intrusive technique that is not damaging the internal nor the
observable behavior of the underlying system. All results
are implemented in a toolbox, named TAKOS: http://
toolboxopacity.gforge.inria.fr.
2) Future work: Other opacity conditions could be han-
dled in this framework such as initial opacity (cf. [25]) or
infinite-step opacity (cf. [26]). New kinds of state estimators
are needed, as shown in [25], [26] for verification purposes.
As the proposed runtime techniques are complementary to
supervisory control, we plan to study how we can combine
those techniques to obtain the best of both worlds. For
instance, when runtime enforcement with a given memory
size is not possible, one may be interested in synthesizing
controllers to restrict the system so as to ensure the existence
of enforcers. Two practical implementation issues should be
addressed. The first one is the retrieval of a suitable model of
the analyzed system from its source or binaries for the pro-
posed techniques to be applicable. The second one concerns
integrating/translating the synthesized (high-level) verifiers
and enforcers to general-purpose programming languages.
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